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I. Introduction 
There have been numerous recent papers that use assignment to the Russell indexes as a source of 
plausibly exogenous variation in firms’ ownership structures.  The underlying idea of this identification 
strategy is to exploit variation in institutional ownership that occurs around the cutoff point used to 
construct two widely used market benchmarks—the Russell 1000, which comprises the largest 1,000 U.S. 
stocks, in terms of market capitalization, and the Russell 2000, which comprises the next largest 2,000 
stocks. Because portfolio weights assigned to each stock within these indexes are value-weighted, the 
assignment of an individual stock to one or the other index can have a significant impact on the extent of 
ownership by institutional investors such as mutual funds.  Stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000 will 
have small portfolio weights because they represent the smallest firms in that index, while stocks at the 
top of the Russell 2000 will have weights that are an order of magnitude larger because they represent the 
largest firms in that index. Therefore, for each dollar invested in an institutional portfolio using the 
Russell 1000 as a benchmark, very little of it will be invested in stocks at the bottom of that index; while 
for each dollar invested in an institutional portfolio using the Russell 2000 as a benchmark, a large 
proportion of it will be invested in stocks at the top of the index. This benchmarking leads to a sharp 
difference in ownership by institutional investors for stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 relative to 
stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000 even though these stocks are otherwise similar in terms of their 
overall market capitalization.   
And yet, despite this relatively straightforward idea, various papers have reached surprisingly 
different conclusions on exactly how index assignment affects firms’ ownership structures.  For example,  
Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2015) propose an instrumental variable estimation involving the Russell 
1000/2000 threshold that differs from previous and contemporaneous papers that use the Russell 
empirical setting for identification.  While the focus of Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2015) is different than 
other papers in this literature, it nevertheless discusses some findings that differ from those reported 
elsewhere in the literature.  For example, Boone and White (2014), Crane, Michenaud, and Weston 
(2014), and others argue that there is a much larger 10-25 percentage point difference in total institutional 
ownership around the cutoff that appears to be driven by a difference in both passive and active 
institutional ownership (as measured using institution-level (13F) data and Bushee (2001) classifications 
for “quasi-index” (i.e., passive), “transient” (i.e., active), and “dedicated” institutions).  Appel, Gormley, 
and Keim (2015), however, argues that there is a much smaller difference in institutional ownership 
around the cutoff, and that the difference is confined to ownership by passive investors (as shown using 
both institution-level 13F data and fund-level S12 data, the latter allowing for a more precise measure of 
active and passive ownership).  Moreover, in further contrast to other papers, the IV methodology of 
Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2015) also fails to detect significant differences in CEO compensation 
 
 
around the threshold or differences in firm policies related to investments, acquisitions, capital structure, 
and cash holdings.    
This paper discusses the differences in methodology choices of various papers in this literature 
and why they seem to reach different conclusions.  As discussed below, the primary reason for these 
differences resides in many papers’ comparison of stocks around the threshold after endogenously 
resorting stocks within indexes using Russell’s float-adjusted market cap-based rankings.  This resorting 
causes a severe endogeneity problem; in essence, these papers compare the least liquid, highest inside 
ownership stocks of the Russell 1000 to the most liquid, lowest inside ownership stocks of the Russell 
2000, causing them to overstate the impact of index assignment on firms’ ownership structure and 
wrongly attribute differences in firms’ capital structure, investments, composition of managerial pay, and 
other outcomes to index assignment.  
 
II. Specification choices when using the Russell 1000/2000 threshold for identification 
A seemingly attractive approach to estimating the effect of ownership structure in the Russell 
1000/2000 setting is to use regression discontinuity estimation (RD). The RD estimation attempts to make 
use of a discontinuity in ownership between the 1000th and 1001st largest firms at the end of May each 
year to identify their effect on corporate outcomes. An advantage of this approach is the ability to focus 
on a subset of firms very close to cutoff, thus reducing concerns that the estimation is not adequately 
controlling for the one variable that determines index assignment—the end-of-May market caps 
calculated by Russell—or other possible differences among firms that might be correlated with a firm’s 
index assignment even after conditioning on market capitalization and other controls.   
 If the end-of-May market capitalization as calculated by Russell was observable and perfectly 
predicted index assignment, then researchers interested in determining the effect of the being assigned to 
the Russell 2000 could estimate the following sharp regression discontinuity estimation:  
	 		 (1)	
where Y is the outcome of interest for firm i in year t, Rank is the ranking of firm i in year t in terms of 
end-of-May market capitalization (e.g., the 995th largest firm would have a rank of 995), and R2000 is an 
indicator that equals one for firms assigned to the Russell 2000.  The sample could then be restricted to 
firms very close to the cutoff threshold of Rank = 1000, and the polynomial order of controls, N, could 
also be varied.1  The above estimation of  would identify the effect of being assigned to Russell 2000 
on outcome Y by testing for a discontinuity in Y between the 1000th and 1001st largest firms, as 
determined using end-of-May market capitalization.   
																																								 																				
1  One could also add an additional set of controls, , to allow the functional form of the 
relation between Rank and outcome Y to vary above and below the cutoff.  See Angrist and Pischke (2009), Lee and 
Lemieux (2010), and Roberts and Whited (2013) for more details regarding regression discontinuity estimations. 
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It is not possible to estimate the above equation, however, since the market capitalization used by 
Russell to determine firms’ index assignment at the end of May is not observable to the econometrician.  
Specifically, Russell calculates firms’ market capitalization using a proprietary calculation that does not 
perfectly match up to market capitalizations reported elsewhere, such as in CRSP, and because of this, 
econometricians can only imperfectly predict firms’ index assignments.    
Some have proposed switching to a fuzzy regression discontinuity to overcome this problem (see 
e.g., Mullins (2014)).  In particular, fuzzy regression estimation could be achieved by estimating Equation 
(1) and using Treatment as an instrument for R2000, where Treatment is an indicator that equals one for 
firms with a Rank greater than 1000, where Rank is determined using end-of-May market capitalizations.  
 A problem with using the end-of-May market capitalization as an instrument in a fuzzy regression 
discontinuity, however, is that even the market caps provided by Russell, are a weak predictor of index 
assignment near the cutoff.  As can be seen in the top panel of Figure 1, having a ranking above or below 
1000 is a poor predictor of being in the Russell 2000 for firms near threshold between the 1000th and 
1001st largest firms.  In fact, firms with a ranking of 995-1000 are equally likely to be in the Russell 2000 
as firms ranked 1001-1005.  While the predictive power of end-of-May market caps is better further from 
this threshold, this is not helpful in that fuzzy regression discontinuity estimations rely on a discontinuity 
in probability of treatment at the threshold, not at points further away from the threshold (Angrist and 
Pischke (2009), Lee and Lemieux (2010), Roberts and Whited (2013)).  Absent such a discontinuity, the 
estimation will suffer from a weak instrument problem.   
 The weakness of using fuzzy regression discontinuity estimation in this setting can be further 
seen in a graph of average quasi-index ownership by firms’ ranking in the vicinity of the threshold.  This 
is shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1, which provides a graphical representation of the reduced form 
version of the fuzzy regression discontinuity estimation.  As shown in Figure 1, there is no meaningful 
jump in quasi-index ownership close to the 1000/2000 threshold using this approach.  The reason is that 
each missed index assignment is introducing considerable noise in the estimation.  For example, every 
firm ranked between 950 and 1000 that is actually in the Russell 2000 will likely be at the top of their 
index (and hence receive a large jump in ownership by passive investors), while every firm ranked 
between 1001 and 1050 that is actually in the Russell 1000 will likely be at the bottom of their index. This 
correlation in the structure of noise near the threshold can also cause a fuzzy RD estimation to yield 
estimates that are the opposite of the true effect, thus potentially explaining why Mullins (2014) finds a 
counterintuitive decrease in institutional ownership for firms at the top of the Russell 2000. See Crane, 
Michenaud, and Weston (2014) for more details regarding this latter issue. 
 To address this concern, other papers propose to use the actual rankings assigned by Russell in a 
regression discontinuity framework (e.g., see Boone and White (2014); Crane, Michenaud, and Weston 
(2014)).  However, if actual Russell-assigned rankings, rather than end-of-May market cap rankings, are 
instead used to calculate the forcing variable, Rank, then other variables will no longer be continuous at 
 
 
the threshold, which violates the underlying identification assumption of the regression discontinuity 
(Angrist and Pischke (2009), Lee and Lemieux (2010), Roberts and Whited (2013)).  In particular, there 
will be a discontinuity in firms’ float-adjusted market cap since Russell resorts firms within each index 
based on their float-adjusted market cap after index assignments are made; firms at the bottom of the 
Russell 1000 will have a much smaller float-adjusted market cap than firms at the top of the Russell 2000. 
This is seen in the top half of Figure 2, where we plot the average Ln(float-adjusted market cap) by firms’ 
Russell-assigned ranking.  On average, the firm with a Russell-assigned ranking of 1000 (i.e., the bottom 
firm in the Russell 1000) has a float-adjusted market cap that is more than two log points smaller than the 
firm with a Russell-assigned ranking of 1001 (i.e., the top firm in the Russell 2000).  
 This difference in float-adjusted market cap between firms at the bottom of the Russell 1000 and 
the top of the Russell 2000 causes this modified RD methodology to overstate the actual impact of index 
assignment on firms’ ownership structure and corporate policies.  In particular, this RD methodology 
compares the least liquid stocks of the Russell 1000 index (which active institutions will endogenously 
avoid) against the most liquid stocks of the Russell 2000.  Moreover, the differences in float-adjusted 
market cap around the cutoff will mechanically generate an endogenous shift in ownership structure. 
Stocks at the very bottom of the Russell 1000 are those that have a much smaller float-adjusted market 
cap relative to their total market cap, and this occurs when large blocks of a firm’s equity is held by 
insiders or other non-financial companies.  These endogenous differences in liquidity and inside 
ownership likely explain why Boone and White (2014), Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2014), and other 
papers that use this identification strategy argue there is a much larger 10-25 percentage difference in 
institutional ownership (both active and passive) around the cutoff.   
The IV estimation of Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2015) is designed to overcome these 
shortcomings but still allow the Russell 1000/2000 threshold be used as a source of identification.  As 
demonstrated in Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2015), there is only a difference in passive institutional 
ownership using their IV estimation, and the observed magnitude (which is about an order of magnitude 
less than reported in other papers) matches what one would predict based on the amount of money 
passively tracking each index.  Their IV specification’s ability to isolate the exogenous differences in 
ownership also explains why their findings for corporate policies and managerial pay differ from previous 
studies of the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff; in particular, they find little evidence of a difference in firms’ 
leverage, investment, acquisitions, or composition of managerial pay.2  Further discussion of their 
methodology and findings can be found in their paper.  
																																								 																				
2 Using May 31st CRSP market capitalization to determine rankings (within the actual assigned index), as done in a 
robustness check by Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2014), will be problematic for a similar reason.  Because firms 
are resorted within an index using total end-of-May CRSP market caps in this alternative approach, there will now 
exist a discontinuity in Ln(Mktcap) near the threshold.  The firm with the smallest end-of-May CRSP Mktcap within 
the Russell 1000 will be assigned a rank of 1000, while the firm with the largest end-of-May CRSP Mktcap within 
the Russell 2000 will be assigned a rank of 1001. This discontinuity occurs because the CRSP market caps are only 
a noisy predictor of the true, but unobserved, forcing variable. This is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 1 
Probability of treatment and quasi-index ownership by ranking near the Russell 
1000/2000 threshold using Russell-provided market capitalizations 
This figure plots the average fraction of firm-year observations in the Russell 2000 and percent 
quasi-index ownership by size ranking for the 950th to 1050th largest firms, where ranking is 
determined using end-of-May market capitalization numbers provided directly by Russell 
Investments for firms in the Russell 1000/2000 indices between 2002 and 2006. Averages are 
calculated using bins of five rankings and data from 2002-2006.  
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Figure 2 
Average Ln(Float) and Ln(Mktcap) by ranking, where ranking is calculated using 
either float-adjusted portfolio weights assigned by Russell or within-index rankings 
based on end-of-May market capitalizations 
The top panel of this figure plots the average Ln(float-adjusted market cap) by Russell-determined 
rankings for the bottom 50 firms in the Russell 1000 index and the top 50 firms in the Russell 
2000 index for the years 1998-2006.  A ranking of 1000 reflects the firm with the lowest portfolio 
weight in the Russell 1000 index, while a ranking of 1001 reflects the firm with the highest 
portfolio weight in the Russell 2000 index.  The bottom panel of this figure plots the average 
Ln(end-of-May CRSP market cap) by size ranking for firms ranked between 950 and 1050, where 
ranking is determined using within-index end-of-May CRSP market caps.   A ranking of 1000 
reflects the firm with the lowest end-of-May market cap in the Russell 1000 index, while a 
ranking of 1001 reflects the firm with the highest end-of-May market cap in the Russell 2000 
index.  Averages are calculated using bins of five rankings for the years 1998-2006.   
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